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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Accepting the proposition that ￿rms are forward-looking, economists have constructed
myriad dynamic models of industry evolution, that is, models that incorporate time and
(sometimes) uncertainty. For reasons of tractability, most of these have been two-period
models. While two-period models have yielded many important insights, they suﬀer from
the well-known drawback that the ￿nal period behaves like a static (one-period) model.
This is a potential problem because ￿rms expecting static behavior in the near future may
behave diﬀerently than ￿rms expecting continued dynamic behavior. Circumventing this
problem are the stochastic in￿nite-horizon models of industry evolution. Most of these
models￿e.g. Jovanovic (1982), Dixit (1989), Lambson (1991), Rob (1991), Hopenhayn
(1992), and Klepper (1996)￿posit in￿nitesimally-sized price-taking ￿rms. Thus they yield
insights into competitive processes but are ill-suited for exploring traditional industrial
organization questions regarding market structure and monopoly power.1
The present paper formulates a stochastic in￿nite-horizon model where the number
of ￿rms is required to be an integer. The framework generates endogenous entry and
exit from shocks￿such as changes in demand or factor prices￿that are external to the
￿rms. The in￿nite-horizon nature of the model avoids the ￿￿nal period problem￿ while
the requirement that there be an integer number of ￿rms￿rather than a continuum of
in￿nitesimally-sized ￿rms￿makes the model suitable for addressing traditional indus-
trial organization questions concerning imperfect competition. Furthermore, the integer
constraint￿and the resulting inability to satisfy equilibrium zero-pro￿t conditions with
equality￿has economically relevant implications for the behavior of ￿rms over time.
The ￿rst part of the paper￿comprising Sections 2 through 5￿contains a rather in-
formal description of the model followed by several examples that oﬀer insights into tra-
ditional industrial organization questions. The second part of the paper￿comprising
Sections 6 through 8￿contains a formal description of the model, addresses technical
equilibrium existence issues, and contains a rather general investigation of the welfare
properties of equilibrium entry and exit when competition is imperfect. Although Sec-
1An interesting exception is due to Ericson and Pakes (1995). The relationship between their model
and ours is discussed in Section 6.
2tions 2 through 5 are rather informal, and the equilibria are presented intuitively without a
careful de￿nition of the equilibrium concept, the interested reader will have little diﬃculty
verifying that the described outcomes are indeed associated with equilibria as formally
de￿n e di nS e c t i o n6 .
Section 2 contains an informal description of the model and de￿nes the notation that
is essential to the examples presented in Sections 3 through 5.
Section 3 questions the implicit assumption underlying much of the industrial organi-
zation literature that high sunk costs result in high concentration, that is, that high sunk
costs reduce the number of ￿rms that are active in an industry. It is shown by example
that this belief depends on static thinking. In a dynamic environment sunk costs reduce
both entry and exit. Thus, although high sunk costs mean that fewer ￿rms enter in good
times they also mean that more ￿rms remain active in bad times; hence the eﬀect on the
average number of ￿rms over time is ambiguous.
Section 4 considers the question of why new ￿rms often lose money before eventually
becoming pro￿table. This can be explained in a variety of ways that depend on imperfect
information. (For example, imperfect capital markets may cause delays in achieving
minimum eﬃcient scale or learning-by-doing may be required before a ￿rm￿s technology
becomes pro￿table.) Our model suggests another possibility that depends critically on
the requirement that the number of ￿rms be an integer. The implicit lumpiness of the
technology means that the zero-pro￿t entry condition is not exactly satis￿ed except by
chance; thus the expected present value of an entrant typically exceeds its entry cost. In
equilibrium, the lure of these economic pro￿ts can induce ￿rms to enter sooner than they
would like￿for example, before demand allows for positive operating pro￿ts￿in order to
￿hold the place.￿ (The example in Section 4 also suggests that unregulated entry tends to
result in excessive entry, a result previously established by Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
in the context of a two-stage model. This topic is revisited more generally in Section 8.)
Section 5 contains a result that is interpretable economically as well as relevant to
the existence issues discussed in a later section. When a ￿rm considers whether to enter,
the number of periods over which it can recoup its sunk cost matters. In particular, it
seems plausible that more ￿rms would enter (or fewer ￿rms exit) given a longer time hori-
3zon. Although this is true when ￿rms are in￿nitesimally-sized price-takers￿see Lambson
(1992)￿it is not true here. Thus, for example, lengthening the product cycle may not
result in an increase in the number of initial entrants. Indeed, the level of entry (or exit)
in a given period can change non-monotonically as the horizon lengthens.
Section 6 contains a formal description of the general, in￿nite-horizon, stochastic
framework. The model is a dynamic stochastic game in discrete time with countably
in￿nitely many time periods and potential ￿rms. An equilibrium is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium vector of the ￿rms￿ entry and exit strategies.
Section 7 contains a general proof that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists as
the limit of ￿nite-horizon equilibria. The strategic nature of entry and exit decisions,
the integer constraint, and the non-monotonicities documented in Section 5 imply that
straightforward extensions of proofs in models with continua of ￿rms are inadequate to
prove existence of equilibrium in the current framework.
Section 8 considers the welfare implications of unregulated entry and exit when there
is imperfect competition. As noted above, Section 4 suggests that unregulated entry
may result in too much entry relative to the socially optimal outcome. That there is a
tendency for excessive entry in a two-stage model￿where ￿rms make entry decisions in
the ￿rst stage and production decisions in the second stage￿was established by Mankiw
and Whinston (1986). The general, stochastic, in￿nite-horizon model of Sections 6 and
7 allows a deeper investigation. For the class of equilibria from Section 7, not only is
there a tendency for excessive entry when times are good but there is also a tendency for
insuﬃcient exit when times are bad. Furthermore, these tendencies are not reversed in
the present even when ￿rms take into account that there will tend to be too many ￿rms
in the future. Thus, these equilibria tend to exhibit too many active ￿rms in every period
of every realization of the stochastic process. (￿Tendency￿ means that the number of
active ￿rms never falls more than one short of the optimal number, and may greatly exceed
it.) This result only applies to the ￿limit equilibria￿ constructed in Section 7, however.
Section 8 also contains an example of an equilibrium in which entry falls more than one
short of the optimal number of ￿rms. Thus the tendency for an excessive number of ￿rms
in imperfectly competitive markets is not universal.
4Section 9 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model: An Informal Description
The reader who is interested in the technical details of the model is referred to Section 6.
Here just enough detail is provided to allow the reader to follow the examples in Sections
3 through 5.
There are countably in￿nitely many ￿rms with a countably in￿nite time horizon. A
market condition is a description of all relevant exogenous variables in a given time period;
for example, the description of a market condition may include factor prices, demand,
entry costs, scrap values, and the regulatory environment among other things. Market
conditions follow an exogenous stochastic process known to the ￿rms.
At most ￿nitely many ￿rms are initially active, that is, capable of producing without
paying an entry cost. The other ￿rms are initially inactive. At the beginning of each
period, ￿rms observe the current market condition, say, m. Furthermore, they recall all
past market conditions as well as all the ￿rms￿ previous entry and exit decisions. Then
inactive ￿rms decide whether to pay an entry cost ξm > 0 to become active and active
￿rms decide whether to accept a scrap value χm < ξm to become inactive. After entry
and exit decisions are implemented, each active ￿rm receives a current pro￿to fπm(y),
where y is the number of active ￿rms. Thus πm is a reduced-form pro￿t function; it
is assumed to be non-increasing in y. In equilibrium, each ￿rm chooses an entry and
exit strategy to maximize the expected present value of its pro￿t stream given the entry
and exit strategies of the other ￿rms. Firms discount their pro￿t streams with the same
discount factor, δ ∈ (0,1).
This concludes the informal description of the model. A formal description is contained
in Section 6. The next three sections contain some examples.
53 Concentration and Entry Barriers
It is natural￿but, as this section demonstrates, incorrect￿to believe that higher sunk
costs necessarily decrease the number of ￿rms in an industry. Put another way, it is
natural to believe that higher sunk costs increase an industry￿s concentration, typically
de￿ned as the combined market share of the largest ￿rms. Partly because of this belief,
much eﬀort has gone into debating the empirical importance of entry barriers such as
sunk costs.2 Little of this literature has challenged the assertion that entry barriers and
concentration are positively correlated.3 This section challenges that assertion, showing
by example that it depends critically on static reasoning. In a dynamic context, higher
entry barriers indeed reduce the number of entrants when times are good but they also
reduce the number of ￿rms that exit when times are bad. The net eﬀect on the average
number of ￿r m so v e rt i m ei sa m b i g u o u s .
Suppose there are two market conditions: market condition H exhibits high demand
and market condition L exhibits low demand. Suppose the initial market condition
is H; thereafter market conditions follow the i.i.d. stochastic process characterized by
the probabilities ρH and ρL of the respective market conditions. In market condition






. Assume that both market conditions have the same
entry cost ξ a n dt h es a m es c r a pv a l u eχ. The discount factor is δ. Initially there are no
active ￿rms.
Using standard recursive methods, it follows that if ym ￿rms are active in market
condition m,t h e na￿rm that never exits has an expected present value (before deducting
2A lot of this debate has centered around a perceived positive correlation between concentration and
pro￿t rates across industries. See, for example, Weiss (1974), Demsetz (1974), Dewey (1976), La Manna
(1986) and Lambson (1987).
3An exception is Bernheim (1984) who, in a ￿nite model of sequential entry, made the point that when
future entry deterrence is more costly, current potential entrants may be less likely to enter. Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) and Lambson (1992) point out that in dynamic competitive models higher sunk costs
reduce both entry in good times and exit in bad times and that either eﬀect may dominate on average.
6the entry cost) of
νH(yH,y L)=πH(yH)+δ[ρHνH(yH,y L)+ρLνL(yH,y L)]
in the high demand market condition and an expected present value of
νL(yH,y L)=πL(yL)+δ[ρHνH(yH,y L)+ρLνL(yH,y L)]
in the low demand market condition. Solving these two equations for νH and νL yields
νH(yH,y L)=





(1 − δρH)πL(yL)+( δρH)πH(yH)
(1 − δ)
. (3.2)
Finally, a ￿rm the enters in market condition H and then exits (for good) in the next
realization of market condition L h a sa ne x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo fνx
H(yH,y L)=πH(yH)+
δ[ρHνx







To construct the example, impose the following values: aH =2 , aL =1 , ρH = ρL = .5,
δ = .9,a n dχ =1 .35. If the entry cost is the relatively high ξ =1 .65 then it will be argued
that yH = yL =3in equilibrium, so the average number of active ￿rms is 3. By contrast,
if the entry cost is the relatively low ξ =1 .39 then it will be argued that yH =4and
yL =1in equilibrium, so the average number of active ￿rms is only 2.5. Thus, contrary
to the conventional wisdom, average concentration over time is negatively related to entry
barriers. Formal and complete descriptions of the equilibrium strategies are omitted in
this section￿such formalities are postponed until section 6￿but a heuristic argument
that the equilibria have these properties will be given.
First consider equilibrium when the entry cost is ξ =1 .65.T o s e e t h a t yH = yL =3 ,
suppose three ￿rms adopt the strategy of entering and never exiting. Given the imposed
values, (3.1) and (3.2) imply
νH(3,3) ’ 1.656 > ξ > 1.469 ’ νL(3,3) > χ.
7Thus, each of the three ￿rms has expected present value exceeding entry cost when
demand is high and exceeding scrap value when demand is low. A fourth ￿rm would
achieve an expected present value of νH(4,4) ’ 1.1 < ξ if it entered immediately and
never exited or an expected present value of νx
H(4,3) ’ 1.4 < ξ if it entered and exited
on the ￿rst occurrence of market condition L. (See (3.1) and (3.3).) Other attempts to
enter and exit advantageously similarly fail to cover the entry cost.
Now consider equilibrium when the entry cost is only ξ =1 .39.T o s e e t h a t yH =4
and yL =1 , suppose one ￿rm adopts the strategy of entering immediately and never
exiting while a group of other ￿rms (three at a time) adopt the strategy of entering
when (it is ￿their turn￿ and) the market condition H is realized, and exiting at the ￿rst
subsequent occurrence of market condition L.4 Given the imposed values, (3.3) implies
that a ￿rm that enters in market condition H and exits at the ￿rst occurrence of market
condition L has an expected present value (discounted back to the period of entry) of
νx
H(4,1) ’ 1.395 > ξ in market condition H. The single ￿rm that never exits has
an expected present value￿from (3.2)￿of νL(4,1) ’ 2.095 > χ in market condition L;
as e c o n d￿rm will not ￿nd it optimal to remain active in market condition L because
νL(4,2) ’ 1.331 < χ.F u r t h e r m o r e , a ￿fth ￿rm considering entry in market condition H
faces an expected present value of νx
H(5,1) ’ 1.31 < ξ if it exits at the ￿rst subsequent
occurrence of market condition L or an expected present value of νH(5,2) ’ 1.12 < ξ if
it never exits. Other attempts to enter (or remain active) ￿out of turn￿ similarly fail to
cover the entry cost (or scrap value).
This example establishes that the long run average number of ￿rms may be lower with
lower entry barriers, contrary to the conventional wisdom. The intuition is that, although
lower entry costs induce more entry when times are good, they also induce more exit
when times are bad; hence the eﬀect on the long-run average number of active ￿rms is
ambiguous.
4The meaning of ￿their turn￿ will be clear in section 7.
84 Preemptive Entry
Firms entering an industry often lose money initially before becoming pro￿table. This
can be explained in a variety of ways that depend on imperfect information. (For exam-
ple, imperfect capital markets may cause delays in achieving minimum eﬃcient scale or
learning-by-doing may be required before a ￿rm￿s technology becomes pro￿table.) This
section contains another possibility that depends critically on lumpy sunk costs, that is,
on the requirement that the number of ￿rms be an integer. The lumpiness of the technol-
ogy means that, even allowing for entry, economic pro￿ts can be made; if the constraint
that the number of ￿rms must be an integer is binding￿as will be the case except by
chance￿then the expected present value of entrants exceeds their entry costs. In equilib-
rium, the lure of these economic pro￿ts can induce ￿rms to enter sooner than they would
like￿for example, before demand allows for positive operating pro￿ts￿in order to ￿hold
the place.￿ Thus this explanation is related to the ￿rent dissipation￿ literature. (See,
for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1987).)
Suppose there are three market conditions: H, M,a n dL (meant to suggest high,
medium, and low demand, respectively). Beginning with market condition H,m a r k e t
conditions follow an i.i.d. stochastic process characterized by the probabilities ρH, ρM,
and ρL, respectively. In market condition m ∈ {H,M,L} inverse demand is P = am −Q






− φ. Assume that all market conditions have the same entry
cost ξ a n dt h es a m es c r a pv a l u eχ. The discount factor is δ. Initially there are no active
￿rms.
To construct the example, impose the following values: ρH = .6, ρM = .3, ρL = .1,
aH =1 5 , aM =8 , aL =3 , ξ =1 , χ =0 ,a n dφ =2 . It will be argued that, given the
imposed values, equilibrium exhibits yH =8￿rms in market condition H, yM =6￿rms
in market condition M if the previous distinct market condition was H, yM =5￿rms
in market condition M if the previous distinct market condition was L,a n dyL =2in
market condition L. Thus, each time the market condition changes to H there is entry
until eight ￿rms are active. Each time the market condition changes to L there is exit
9until two ￿rms remain active. The result of a change to market condition M depends
on prior history: if there were previously eight active ￿rms (because the change to M
is from market condition H) then there is exit until six ￿rms remain but if there were
previously only two ￿rms (because the change to M is from market condition L)t h e n
there is entry until ￿ve ￿rms are active. The history-dependence of the number of active
￿rms in market condition M re￿ects hysteresis caused by the sunk costs. (See Dixit
(1989) or Lambson (1992).)
To see that this example exhibits entry with negative current pro￿ts in￿nitely often,
note that πM(5) ’ −.22; thus whenever the market condition changes from L to M,
three ￿rms enter even though current pro￿ts are negative. They do so hoping to earn
πH(8) ’ .78 often enough in the future to cover the entry cost before they are forced to
exit when the market condition returns to L.
As in the previous section, a full description of the equilibrium strategies is omitted
here, but a heuristic argument that equilibrium is as described will be given. Suppose
initially (when the market condition is H)t h a te i g h t￿rms enter, two with the intention
of never exiting, two with the intention of exiting when either M or L is realized, and four
with the intention of exiting only when L is realized. Thereafter, there are four kinds
of market condition changes to consider: changes to H (from either M or L), changes
to M from H, changes to M from L, and changes to L (from either H or M). The
arguments for the ￿rst two cases will be sketched. The other cases are similar￿albeit
more complicated￿and are omitted. In what follows, νmn is the expected present value
of a ￿rm in market condition m that intends to exit the next time the market condition
exhibits lower demand than market condition n.
When the market condition changes to H, equilibrium exhibits entry until there are
eight ￿rms, where the marginal ￿rm intends to exit the next time the market condition
changes (and demand falls). Thus the present expected value of the marginal ￿rm is νHH
satisfying νHH = πH(8) + δρHνHH;s oνHH = πH(8)/(1 − δρH) ’ 1.69 > ξ.I f , h o w e v e r ,
an i n t h￿rm entered with the intention of exiting when demand next fell, its expected
present value would be only πH(9)/(1−δρH) ’ .54 < ξ.I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o v e r i f y t h a t
other exit plans similarly fail to cover the entry cost.
10When the market condition changes from H to M, all but six ￿rms exit. The marginal
remaining ￿rm, intending to exit only when L is next realized (and understanding that
there will be entry up to eight ￿rms if H is realized), has an expected present value
of νMM satisfying νMM = πM(6) + δ[ρMνMM + ρHνHM] where νHM satis￿es νHM =
πH(8)+δ[ρMνMM+ρHνHM]. Solve these two equations to write νMM =[ ( 1 −δρH)πM(6)+
δρHπH(8)]/(1−δρM−δρH) ’ .53 > χ. By contrast, if a seventh ￿rm remained active with
the intention of exiting the ￿rst time market condition L is realized, its expected present
value would only be νMM =[ ( 1− δρH)πM(7)+δρHπH(8)]/(1 − δρM − δρH) ’ −.21 < χ.
It is also possible to verify that other exit plans similarly fail to compensate the seventh
￿rm for foregoing its scrap value. Thus only six ￿r m sr e m a i na c t i v ew h e nt h em a r k e t
condition changes from H to M.
In this example, equilibrium is clearly ineﬃcient, even subject to the constraint that
active ￿rms are Cournot (not perfect) competitors. To see this, consider what happens
when the market condition changes from L to M.W i t h ￿ve active ￿rms (as equilibrium
requires), standard calculations establish that current consumer surplus is approximately
22.22 while current industry pro￿t is approximately −1.11; thus current social surplus is
approximately 21.11. If, by contrast, only four ￿rms were active, current consumer surplus
would be 20.48 while current industry pro￿tw o u l db e2.24, resulting in a current social
surplus of 22.72. It follows that a social planner could increase the expected present value
of social surplus relative to the equilibrium level by making the single change of allowing
only four active ￿rms (rather than ￿ve) when the market condition M follows the market
condition L. Not only would it increase current social surplus in those cases, it would
also save on entry costs. Entry is excessive when demand increases from low demand to
medium demand.
It is interesting to note that the ￿fth ￿rm would have an incentive to delay entry until
H is realized, if it could do so without fear of another ￿rm taking its place; by doing so it
could avoid some losses while delaying payment of the entry cost. Equilibrium does not
allow such delay, however, because of the incentive for other ￿rms to enter instead: ￿rms
must enter to ￿hold the place￿ before it is socially optimal to do so.
The insight that unregulated entry can result in excessive entry when competition
11is imperfect is not new. It was formally established in a two-stage model by Mankiw
and Whinston (1986). The stochastic in￿nite-horizon model constructed in Section 6
below allows a much more general investigation. First, however, Section 5 oﬀers one more
example that has economic meaning as well as implications for the technical issues that
follow.
5 Entry, Exit, and Horizon Length
A longer time horizon gives entering ￿rms (or, similarly, ￿rms that refrain from exiting)
more time to recoup entry costs (or, similarly, foregone scrap values); this eﬀect tends to
increase the current number of ￿rms. However, a longer time horizon may also increase
the future number of active ￿rms, potentially making it more diﬃcult to recoup entry
costs or foregone scrap values; this eﬀect tends to reduce the current number of active
￿rms.
In dynamic models with in￿nitesimal price-taking ￿rms there is no ambiguity: the ￿rst
eﬀect dominates. The intuition is not hard to grasp. In continuum models zero-pro￿t
conditions can be exactly satis￿ed, so a ￿rm￿s equilibrium present value is maximized
(and equal to the entry cost) when there is entry. Hence future increased entry due to
a longer horizon implies that future pro￿t streams are maximally attractive, and thus
cannot reduce the attractiveness of current activity. It follows that the number of ￿rms
in any given period is (weakly) increasing in the time horizon. Lambson (1992) used this
monotonicity to show that an in￿nite-horizon equilibrium can be constructed as the limit
of ￿nite-horizon equilibria when there is a continuum of in￿nitesimal price-taking ￿rms.
When the number of ￿rms must be an integer, by contrast, either eﬀect may dominate,
because zero-pro￿t conditions need not be satis￿ed with equality. Since entry doesn￿t
imply maximal present values, future increased entry due to a longer horizon may (but
need not) reduce the attractiveness of future pro￿t streams, make current activity less
attractive, and thus reduce the current number of ￿rms. This ambiguity suggests that
the number of active ￿rms in a given time period need not be monotonic in the horizon.
The remainder of this section contains an example of the non-monotonicity phenomenon.
12Thus monotonicity arguments that are useful for proving existence in the analogous model
with a continuum of ￿rms fail in the present circumstance.
Suppose inverse demand in period t is Pt = at − Qt and that there are no production





. Assume there is no scrap value￿
that is, χt =0for all t￿and let the entry cost be ξt =1in every period. The discount
factor is δ = 1
2.S u p p o s et h eat values are given by a1 =1 , a2 =4−ε,a n dat =6for t ≥ 3.
Since there are no scrap values, and since operating pro￿ts are always positive, there will
never be any exit. Suppose no ￿rms are initially active, and let yT
t be the number of ￿rms
that are active in period t if the horizon length is T ≥ t.
First consider the truncated model where ￿rms expect the market to last for one
period. Then y1
1 ￿rms will enter, where y1











In the one-period truncation there is no entry if there are initially no ￿rms.
Next consider the two-period truncation, that is, let T =2 . Apply backward induction.
Assuming (as turns out to be the case) that there is entry in period 2, y2







≥ 1. Thus for small ε > 0, y2
2 =2 .T h e n y2














≥ 1.S of o rs m a l lε > 0, y2
1 =1 . In summary,
y
2
1 =1 ; y
2
2 =2 .
In the two-period truncation one ￿rm enters in period 1 and then an additional ￿rm enters
in period 2.
Finally, consider the three-period truncation, that is, let T =3 . Apply backward
induction. Assuming (as turns out to be the case) that there is entry in each period, y3
3






≥ 1.T h u sy3
3 =5 .N e x t ,y3














≥ 1.T h u s ,f o rs m a l lε > 0, y3
































13In the three-period truncation, no ￿rms enter in period 1,f o u r￿rms enter in period 2,
and an additional ￿rm enters in period 3.
Notice the non-monotonicity of yT
1 : y1
1 =0 , y2
1 =1 ,a n dy3
1 =0 . The intuition for why
this arises is as follows. In the one-period truncation no ￿rm enters; demand doesn￿t allow
even one ￿rm to recoup the entry cost so quickly. In the two-period truncation, demand
is higher in the second period, thus allowing two ￿rms each to recoup much more than the
entry cost by producing only in period 2. These super-normal pro￿ts occur because of the
integer constraint: if a third ￿rm entered it couldn￿t recoup its entry cost in period 2 alone.
T h el u r eo fs u p e r - n o r m a lp r o ￿ts in period 2 (even discounted) suﬃces to lure one ￿rm to
enter in period 1. In the three-period truncation there is higher demand still in period
3, suﬃcient for ￿ve ￿rms to more than recoup their entry costs just in period 3.O n c e
again, the lure of super-normal pro￿ts in period 3 induces additional entry in period 2,
but the example is constructed so that the super-normal pro￿ts are dissipated in period
2: the integer constraint does not bind very tightly. Thus there are no second-period
super-normal pro￿ts to lure entrants in period 1. This non-monotonicity of the number
of ￿rms as the horizon-length increases implies that monotonicity arguments cannot be
used to establish the existence of a limiting equilibrium in the in￿nite horizon. As will be
seen, a more sophisticated diagonalization argument must be used to prove existence.
This concludes the simple, illustrative examples. With these guides to intuition in
place, the general stochastic model is described (in Section 6), the existence of equilibrium
is proved (in Section 7), and (in Section 8) the tendency for unregulated entry and exit to
result in excessive numbers of ￿rms when there is imperfect competition is investigated.
6 The Model: A Formal Description
Let i ∈ {1,2,...} ≡ I index the countably in￿nite set of ￿rms. Let t ∈ {1,2,...} ≡ I
index the countably in￿nite set of time periods. A market condition is a description of
all relevant exogenous variables in a given time period; for example, the description of a
market condition may include factor prices, demand, entry costs, scrap values, and the
regulatory environment as well as other things. Let m ∈ M index the countable (￿nite
14or in￿nite) set of market conditions. Let mt be the market condition realized in period
t.L e t h =( m1,...,mt) be the market conditions realized in the ￿rst t periods (to be
called a t-period market history), let Ht be the set of possible t-period market histories,
and let H = ∪∞
t=1Ht be the set of all possible ￿nite market histories. Market conditions
b e g i nw i t ha￿rst market condition, m1. Their evolution is governed by the exogenous
stochastic process described by ρ(•|• ),w h e r eρ(g | h) is the probability that the market
history g ∈ Hτ is observed given that the market history h ∈ Ht is observed where τ ≥ t.
Market histories are partially ordered by ρ(•|• ): g ≥ h iﬀ ρ(g | h) > 0 and g>hiﬀ g ≥ h
and g 6= h. The notation f ∈ [h,g] will denote f such that h ≤ f ≤ g.F o rh ∈ Ht and
t ≥ 2, the notation h−1 denotes the immediate predecessor of the market history h; that
is, if h ∈ Ht then h−1 ∈ Ht−1 and lists the ￿rst t − 1 market conditions of h.
At most ￿nitely many ￿rms are initially active and the other ￿rms are initially inactive.
Beginning in period 1, ￿rms choose whether to be active or inactive in each period. Call
ai
0 ∈ {0,1} the initial activity index for ￿rm i and call ai
h ∈ {0,1} the activity index of
￿rm i in the last period of the market history h (or the activity index of ￿rm i at h); an
index of 1 denotes activity and an index of 0 denotes inactivity. Call a0 = {ai
0}i∈I and
ah = {ai
h}i∈I the activity vectors initially and at h, respectively. A pair (m,a) is called a
state; it is interpreted as the current market condition and the previous period￿s activity
vector. A t-period history, s,i sa￿nite realization of states: s = {h,(ag−1)g≤h} for some
h ∈ Ht.( I f g =( m1)￿that is, if t =1 ￿then it is understood that ag−1 = a0.) Let St
be the set of possible t-period histories and let S = ∪∞
t=1St be the set of all possible ￿nite
histories.
At the beginning of each period t ≥ 1, ￿rms observe the history through time t and
then make their entry and exit decisions. Speci￿cally, inactive ￿rms may enter (become
active) by paying a cost ξh while active ￿rms may exit (become inactive) and recoup a
scrap value χh < ξh (which may be negative). After these decisions are made, active
￿rms play a symmetric game (e.g. Cournot) yielding a current payoﬀ of πh(yh) to each
active ￿rm, where yh = Σi∈Iai
h is the number of active ￿rms at h. The de￿nitions of ξh,
χh,a n dπh re￿ect a slight abuse of notation relative to the de￿nitions of ξm, χm,a n d
πm in earlier sections. Although these variables depend on the current market condition
15rather than the entire market history, it is notationally convenient in what follows to use
market history subscripts rather than market condition subscripts. Thus, for example, ξh
is understood to be the entry cost in the market condition prevailing in the last period of
the market history h.
As t r a t e g yf o r￿rm i is a decision rule σi : S → {0,1} that speci￿es ￿rm i￿s activity
index as a function of the history. Given a history s ∈ St, an induced strategy σi
s is the
restriction of σi to histories that follow s (in the sense that their ￿rst t states are the list
s). Let Σi
s be the set of ￿rm i￿s induced strategies given s. The induced strategy pro￿le
σs = {σi
s}i∈I induces a path, that is, a stochastic sequence of activity vectors {ag}g≥h.




















where δ ∈ [0,1) is a discount factor. Equilibrium can now be formally de￿ned.
De￿nition: A (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium is a strategy pro￿le e σ = {e σ}i∈I
such that V
i





s ) for all i ∈ I, for all s ∈ S,a n df o ra l lσi
s ∈ Σi
s,w h e r ee σs
is the strategy pro￿le induced by e σ for each s and where e σ
−i
s is e σs with the ith element
removed.
This concludes the formal description of the model. Of all the industry dynamics
models, the one due to Ericson and Pakes (1995) is closest to ours. Both models allow
for strategic behavior, uncertainty, and endogenous entry and exit by an integer number
of ￿rms. Yet important diﬀerences also exist. On one hand, the Ericson-Pakes model is
more general in that it allows for process-R&D investments by the ￿rms, thereby making
the evolution of technology heterogeneous and endogenous. By contrast, the market
conditions in our model are driven by a stochastic process that is independent of ￿rms￿
actions. On the other hand, our analysis exhibits greater robustness to the speci￿cation
of the primitives. In particular, the nature of the stochastic process for market conditions
is very general. By contrast, the existence of a pure-strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium
in the Ericson-Pakes model crucially relies on the following rather restrictive condition on
each ￿rm￿s transition probability, mapping the current state and investment into (proba-
bility distributions over) the next state: its associated distribution function is concave in
16the investment level. (Ericson and Pakes use this condition to ensure that, given rivals￿
strategies, a ￿rm￿s best response is unique.) The restrictive nature of this assumption
is discussed in some detail by Amir (1996) who argues, in particular, that this excludes,
among others, situations where the next state is a deterministic function of the current
state and actions. Another important diﬀerence is that while the Ericson-Pakes proof is
b a s e do na na b s t r a c t￿xed-point argument, ours is constructive and yields as a by-product
some useful insights into the properties of equilibrium.
7 Existence of Equilibrium
Under weak regularity conditions, this section proves that a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium always exists. The equilibrium constructed in the proof will be called a limit-lifo
equilibrium because it is the limit of ￿nite-horizon equilibria and the last ￿rms to enter
are the ￿rst ￿rms to exit (last in ￿rst out). A heuristic sketch of the proof will ￿rst be
presented, followed by the formal statement and proof of existence. The general method
is to construct an integer pair {Nh,X h} for each market history h where Nh ≤ Xh; Nh
will turn out to be the number of ￿rms in the last period of the market history h if there
is entry￿that is, if there are fewer than Nh active ￿rms going into the period￿while Xh
will turn out to be the number of ￿rms in the last period of the market history h if there is
exit￿that is, if there are more than Xh active ￿rms going into the period. First, integer
pairs {NT
h ,XT
h } are constructed for each T-period truncation of the model by backward
induction; then a limiting argument is invoked as T increases without bound. For each
T-period truncation, each t ≤ T,a n de a c hh ∈ Ht, NT
h is the largest integer such that the
expected present value (through period T)o ft h e￿rm that will be the ￿rst to exit is not
less than the entry cost, given that the number of ￿rms in the last period of each future
market history g,s a yyg, is determined by




g ,y g−1}}. (7.1)
Equation (7.1) says that there is entry in the last period of market condition g if fewer
than NT
g ￿rms are active going into the period and that there is exit if there are more
than XT
g active ￿rms going into the period. Similarly, XT
h is the largest integer such that
17the expected present value (through period T)o ft h e￿rm that will be the ￿r s tt oe x i ti s
not less than the scrap value, given that the number of ￿rms will follow the path de￿ned
by (7.1).
Unfortunately, as seen in section 5, NT
h and XT
h are not necessarily monotonic in T,
making it impossible to verify that limits exist. Instead, a diagonalization argument is
constructed in such a way that, for each h, Nh and Xh can be derived as limits of an
appropriately speci￿ed subsequence. Firms￿ strategies are then constructed so that the
number of ￿rms follows the limiting analog of (7.1),
yg =m i n {Xg,max{Ng,y g−1}}, (7.2)
a n ds u c ht h a tn o￿rm ever has an incentive to deviate from its assigned strategy. This
is done by partitioning the set of initially inactive ￿rms into countably many countable
subsets. Firms in each subset are ordered and then each subset is assigned a market
history. Each inactive ￿rm considers entry only in the last period of its assigned market
history; if its index is suﬃciently low it enters. Active ￿rms consider exit each period
according to a last-in-￿rst-out rule. Any ￿rm that deviates from its assigned behavior by
becoming or remaining active becomes the ￿marginal ￿rm￿￿that is, the ￿rm expected to
exit ￿rst. Any ￿rm that deviates from its assigned behavior by becoming or remaining
inactive loses its chance at further equilibrium activity in the induced subgame.
Of course, some assumptions are required. First, the natural assumption that oper-
ating pro￿ts do not increase with the number of ￿r m si si m p o s e d :
A1. For all h ∈ H, πh(yh) is non-increasing in yh.
Next, it is proper to allow some or all of the Xh values to be in￿nite; this would
correspond to situations where there is no exit regardless of the number of active ￿rms
(e.g. due to the absence of scrap values and ￿xed operating costs). However, it is desirable
to bound entry in each period so that the number of active ￿r m si sa l w a y s￿nite (although
perhaps unbounded over time). This is accomplished as follows. For each h ∈ H,l e tBh
be the collection of subsets of H de￿ned as follows. If βh ∈ Bh,t h e n( 1 )g>hfor all
g ∈ βh,a n d( 2 )i fg ∈ βh and g0 ∈ βh then it is not the case that g>g 0.I n w o r d s , a l l
18market histories in βh follow h but not each other. Given βh ∈ Bh,d e ￿ne
αh = {f ≥ h | f<gfor some g ∈ βh}.
In words, all market histories in αh (weakly) follow h but do not follow any market history
in βh. The next assumption can now be stated.

















Assumption A2 is used to bound the number of active ￿rms at each market history
h. Intuitively, if there are yh > yh active ￿rms in the last period of market condition h
then the marginal ￿rm￿that is, the ￿rst of the yh ￿rms to exit￿cannot have an expected
present value exceeding the left hand side of the inequality in A2. Since this is less than
the entry cost, no more than yh can enter in the last period of h. Thus, since yh is ￿nite
for all h ∈ H, the number of active ￿r m sm u s ta l w a y sb e￿nite (although it may increase
over time without bound).
Finally, a technical assumption is required to ensure that expected present values
converge as the horizon lengthens. This is accomplished by assumption A3:
A3. There exists κ ∈ (δ,1] and M>0 such that, for all t and for all h ∈ Ht,
|πh(1)| <M / κt and |χh| <M / κt.
The theorem can now be stated and rigorously proved. Note that the proof is con-
structive, and thus provides a characterization of an equilibrium. In particular, the
evolution of the number of active ￿r m so v e rt i m ei sg o v e r n e db y( 7 . 2 ) .
Theorem: If A1-A3 are satis￿ed then a (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium exists.
Proof:F o re a c hp o s i t i v ei n t e g e rT a n de a c hm a r k e th i s t o r yh ∈ H,d e ￿ne two integers,
NT
h and XT
h as follows. For t>Tand h ∈ Ht ,l e tNT
h = XT
h =0 .F o rh ∈ HT,d e ￿ne NT
h
and XT
h as the largest integer values of yh satisfying πh(yh)−ξh ≥ 0 and πh(yh)−χh ≥ 0,
respectively, if well-de￿ned. Otherwise, if πh(1) − ξh < 0 let NT
h =0 ;i fπh(1) − χh < 0
let XT
h =0 ;a n di fπh(yh) − χh ≥ 0 for all yh let XT
h = ∞. (A2 implies NT
h is ￿nite.) For
19t<T , and having de￿ned NT
g and XT
g for all g ∈ Hτ and all τ >t ,d e ￿ne NT
h and XT
h









































−1 ∈ Θ and yg <y h
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h is not well-de￿n e di nt h i sw a yt h e np r o c e e da sf o l l o w s .I fV T
h (1)−ξh < 0 let
NT
h =0 ;i fV T
h (1) − χh < 0 let XT
h =0 ;a n di fV T
h (yh) − χh ≥ 0 for all yh let XT
h = ∞.
Note that Θ, Φ,a n dt h eyg values all depend on yh, which dependency is suppressed for
notational clarity. The set Θ contains those future market histories before any of the
active ￿rms at h exit. The set Φ contains those future histories at which, for the ￿rst
time, some ￿rm that was active at h exits. Thus V T
h (yh) is interpretable as the value of
the marginal ￿rm, that is, the active ￿rm at h that will exit ￿rst.
Now index H by the positive integers and let g(j) be the market history assigned to the




























converge to, say, Ng(1) and Xg(1), respectively (where Xg(1) may be in￿nite).












converge to, say, Ng(j) and Xg(j), respectively (where Xg(j) may be in￿nite).











T∈I converge to Ng and Xg, respectively, for all g ∈ H (where Xg may be
in￿nite).
20Note that, by construction, V T
h (NT
h ) ≥ ξh >V T
h (NT
h +1 )and V T
h (XT
h ) ≥ χh >
V T
h (XT
h +1 )for all h ∈ H and for all T if NT
h and XT
h are positive and ￿nite. Thus,
by A3, if Nhand Xh are both positive and ￿nite then Vh(Nh) ≥ ξh ≥ Vh(Nh +1 )and
















where Θ and Φ are as before and yg =m i n {Xg,max{Ng,y g−1}}.I f Xh is in￿nite then
Vh(yh) ≥ χh for all yh.
Construct ￿rms￿ strategies as follows. Let {Ih}h∈H partition the set of initially inactive
￿rms into countably in￿nitely many countably in￿nite subsets. Intuitively, Ih is the set
of ￿rms assigned to consider entry at the market history h.O r d e rt h ey0 initially active
￿rms by their indexes i and assign them the integers from 1 to y0.L e tι0(i) be the integer
initially assigned to the initially active ￿rm i. Now, given a path of activity vectors,
{ag}g≤h, and having de￿ned ιh−1(i) for each active ￿rm at h−1,d e ￿ne ιh(i) for each active
￿rm at h as follows. First order the active ￿rms at h that were also active at h−1 by
ιh−1(i), then order new entrants that belong to the set Ih by their indexes i,a n d￿nally
order new entrants that do not belong to the set Ih by their index numbers i.( A n e w
entrant is a ￿rm for which ai
h − ai
h−1 =1 .) Having ordered the active ￿rms at h,a s s i g n
the positive integers between 1 and yh to them and let ιh(i) be the integer assigned to the








where h(i) is the history such that i ∈ Ih(i).T h u sηi is the number of ￿rms in Ih(i) with
lower indexes than ￿rm i that are not active coming into the last period of the market
history h(i).F i r mi￿s equilibrium strategy e σ
i is given by
If a
i
h−1 =0 then e a
i




h−1 =1 then e a
i
h =1iﬀ Xh ≥ ιh(i).
Note that the construction of the strategies guarantees that
yg =m i n{Xg,max{Ng,y g−1}}
21for all g ∈ H a n dt h a tt h em o s tr e c e n te n t r a n ti st h e￿rst to exit. Thus the marginal
￿rm￿s value￿that is, the value of the active ￿rm at h that will be the ￿rst to exit￿is
given by Vh(yh) along the equilibrium path.
Now consider all possible one-shot deviations at an arbitrary history s. First suppose
an inactive ￿rm deviates by entering when its equilibrium strategy dictates otherwise. By
construction, it will be designated as the marginal ￿rm and will earn Vh(e yh +1)−ξh ≤ 0
where e yh is the equilibrium number of ￿rms at h. Next suppose an inactive ￿rm deviates
by not entering when it is supposed to. It then receives a payoﬀ of zero, which is no greater
than the Vh(e yh)−ξh ≥ 0 it would gain by following its equilibrium strategy. Next suppose
an active ￿rm exits when its equilibrium strategy dictates otherwise. It then receives a
payoﬀ of χh which cannot exceed its equilibrium value of Vh(e yh) ≥ χh. Finally, suppose
an active ￿rm does not exit when its strategy dictates to exit. Then it will be designated
as the marginal ￿rm and will have a value of Vh(e yh +1 )≤ χh, which cannot exceed
its payoﬀ of χh for exiting. It follows that no one-shot deviation from equilibrium￿and
hence no deviation from equilibrium￿is pro￿table. Thus the constructed strategy pro￿le
constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
8 Excessive Entry and Insuﬃcient Exit
The traditional industrial organization literature often implicitly assumed that there is
insuﬃcient entry in imperfectly competitive markets. By contrast, Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) established a tendency toward excessive entry in a simple two-stage framework
where in the ￿rst stage ￿rms make entry decisions and in the second stage active ￿rms
make production decisions. (￿Tendency￿ means that the number of entrants never falls
more than one short of the socially optimal number and can far exceed it, where the
socially optimal number is what would be chosen by a social planner who could control
entry but not production decisions.) Intuitively, ￿rms do not take into account the
eﬀects of their activities on the pro￿ts of their competitors, and the negative eﬀects of
the marginally active ￿rm on aggregate pro￿ts (including the additional entry costs) tend
to overcome the positive eﬀects on consumer surplus. The reason only a tendency can
22be established￿that is, the number of active ￿rms can be one less than optimal￿re￿ects
the integer constraint.
The general, stochastic, in￿nite-horizon model of Sections 6 and 7 allows a much
stronger result. In the class of equilibria constructed in Section 7￿that is, in limit-lifo
equilibria￿not only is there a tendency for excessive entry when times are good but
there is also a tendency for insuﬃcient exit when times are bad. Furthermore, these
tendencies are not reversed in the present even when ￿rms take into account that there
will tend to be too many ￿rms in the future. Thus, equilibrium tends to exhibit too many
active ￿rms in every period of every realization of the stochastic process.5 This theorem
requires additional notation and assumptions￿analogous to those used by Mankiw and
Whinston￿which will now be introduced.
Assume each market condition is completely described by a diﬀerentiable downward-
sloping inverse demand function and a twice diﬀerentiable, non-negative, convex cost
function. Given an initial number of active ￿rms, let y∗ = {y∗
h}h∈H be the socially
optimal stochastic sequence of numbers of ￿rms given that the social planner can control












0 Ph(s)ds − yhch(qyh)









ρh[Sh(yh) − max{0,y h − yh−1}ξh +m a x {0,y h−1 − yh}χh]
where Qyh = yhqh is total output when there are yh ￿rms at h, Ph is the inverse demand
function at h, ch is the individual ￿rm￿s cost function at h, qyh is the equilibrium per-￿rm
output given yh ￿rms at the history h and ρh is the unconditional probability of the
market history h occurring. Sh(yh) will be called the current surplus at h.F o r a l l h,
assume (following Mankiw and Whinston):
A4. Qyh >Q y0
h for all yh >y 0
h and limyh→∞ Qyh < ∞.
A5. qyh <q y0
h for all yh >y 0
h.
5This results contrasts with Rob￿s (1991) continuum model where, due to learning externalities, the
model exhibits insuﬃcient entry.
23A6. Ph(Qyh) − c0
h(qyh) ≥ 0 for all yh.
In words, in each period of each realization, industry output increases and is bounded
in the number of ￿rms, per-￿rm output is decreasing in the number of ￿rms, and price
is no less than the marginal cost given the number of ￿rms. These assumptions are not
very restrictive: Amir and Lambson (2000) provide (minimal) conditions suﬃcient for
A4 and A5 to hold for Cournot equilibria. Speci￿cally, de￿ning ∆ ≡− P 0(Q)+c00(q),
they show that the ￿rst part of A4￿namely Qyh >Q y0
h for all yh >y 0
h￿holds if ∆ > 0
globally.6 This is a very general condition, implied in particular by our assumption that
P is downward-sloping and c is convex. They also show that A5 holds if ∆ > 0 globally
and logP is a concave function, which still covers most examples of interest. On the other
hand, they show that if ∆ < 0 globally (which requires a strongly concave cost function
c), the opposite of the ￿rst part of A4 holds. Also, with ∆ > 0, A5 may fail if logP is
convex. Thus, while A4 and A5 are not universal, they are satis￿ed under very broad
conditions covering most cases of interest in Cournot models. A6 follows directly from
the best reply property of Cournot equilibria.
G i v e na ni n i t i a ln u m b e ro fa c t i v e￿rms, let ye = {ye
h}h∈H be a stochastic limit-lifo
equilibrium sequence of numbers of ￿rms. The theorem asserts that the equilibrium
number of ￿rms never falls short of the optimal number by more than one. It is not
diﬃcult to construct examples where the equilibrium number of ￿rms greatly exceeds the
optimal number.
Theorem: For all h ∈ H, ye
h ≥ y∗
h − 1.
Proof: First note that, for all h ∈ H and for all yh > 1,
Sh(yh) − Sh(yh − 1) =
Z Qyh
Qyh−1
Ph(s)ds − yhch(qyh)+( yh − 1)ch(qyh−1)






Ph(s)ds + yh [ch(qyh) − ch(qyh−1)]
#
≡ πh(yh − 1) − M
yh
h .
6The second part of A4￿namely, limyh→∞ Qyh < ∞￿holds, for example, if P(Q) <c 0(0) for some
Q.
24Assumptions A4-A6 imply M
yh
h > 0,b e c a u s e
M
yh
h ≡ Ph(Qyh−1)qyh−1 −
Z Qyh
Qyh−1
Ph(s)ds + yh [ch(qyh) − ch(qyh−1)]
≥ Ph(Qyh−1)qyh−1 − Ph(Qyh−1)[Qyh − Qyh−1]+yh[ch(qyh) − ch(qyh−1)]
≥ Ph(Qyh−1)qyh−1 − Ph(Qyh−1)[Qyh − Qyh−1]+yhc
0
h(qyh−1)[qyh − qyh−1]




The ￿rst line is de￿nitional, the second is from A4 and P 0 < 0,t h et h i r di sf r o mc00 ≥ 0,
the fourth is from Qy/y = qy (symmetry), and the ￿fth is from A5 and A6.
Consider the T-period truncation of the model. Let y∗(T) be the optimal stochastic







ρh[Sh(yh) − max{0,y h − yh−1}ξh +m a x {0,y h−1 − yh}χh].
The strategy of proof is as follows. First show, by backward induction, that ye
h(T) ≥
y∗
h(T) − 1 for all h ∈ Ht,a l lt ≤ T,a n da l lT. Then limiting arguments as T →∞
establish ye
h ≥ y∗
h − 1 for all h ∈ H.
Consider an arbitrary T and arbitrary h ∈ HT.I f y∗




h − 1. If y∗
h ≥ 2 then let y be the truncated path that is identical to y∗
except that yh = y∗



















where γh = ξh if y∗
h >y ∗
h−1 and γh = χh otherwise. Since M
y∗
h
h > 0,t h i si m p l i e s
πh(y∗
h − 1) > γh.T h u s ,XT
h ≥ y∗





Now consider h ∈ Ht for t<Tand make the induction hypothesis that, for all g>h
in the truncated model, XT
g ≥ y∗










h ≥ 2 then consider the path y that
is identical to y∗ except yh = y∗








for g>h ;i n
words, y follows the optimal path until h, exhibits one less ￿rm at h, and then is induced
by the equilibrium strategies thereafter. De￿ne three sets:
A =
n
g ≥ h | yf = y
∗
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The ￿rst set, A, is the set of histories exhibiting no change in either path from the number
of ￿rms at h. The second and third sets together are the set of ￿￿r s tt i m e s ￿t h a te i t h e r
of the paths exhibits entry or exit; B is the set of such ￿￿rst times￿ that exhibits no exit
along the optimal path (and hence exhibits entry or exit along the path y)a n dC is the
s e to fs u c h￿ ￿rst times￿ that exhibits exit along the optimal path.








g−1 then, by the
induction hypothesis, NT
g ≥ y∗
g − 1 >y g−1;t h u sV T
g (yg) ≥ ξg (because, intuitively, there
is entry along the path y induced by equilibrium strategies). If y∗
g = y∗
g−1 and g ∈ B
then yg 6= yg−1 = y∗
g − 1. Since, by the induction hypothesis, y∗
g − 1 ≤ XT
g ,i tm u s tb e
that yg >y g−1.T h u s yg = NT
g and V T
g (yg) ≥ ξg.T h u s V T
g (yg) ≥ ξg for all g ∈ B.
Furthermore, it is trivial that V T
g (yg) ≥ χg for all g ∈ C.
Now de￿ne the path y0 for the truncated model by y0
g = y∗
h − 1 for g ∈ A and y0
g = y∗
g




























where γh = ξh if y∗
h >y ∗
h−1, γh = χh otherwise, and where Aτ ≡ A ∩ Hτ, Bτ ≡ B ∩ Hτ,
and Cτ ≡ C ∩ Hτ.S i n c eM
y∗
h

























































h − 1) +
X
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h − 1) ≥ γh.
Thus, XT
h ≥ y∗




h −1. Thus, by induction,
for all h ∈ Ht and t ≤ T, XT
h ≥ y∗





With this result in hand it follows immediately that, for the same initial conditions, the
equilibrium path satisfying ye









will always satisfy ye
h ≥ y∗
h−1
in the truncated model. Intuitively, when there is entry along the optimal path there will
be at least NT
h ≥ y∗
h −1 ￿rms on the equilibrium path (because ye
h ≥ NT
h for all h). Thus
ye
h <y ∗
h −1 could only arise if there is exit along the equilibrium path; but if there is exit




Thus, for all T, the result holds for the truncated model. Taking limits (using diago-
nalization arguments as described in Section 7) then establishes the result. Q.E.D.
By its very construction, our in￿nite-horizon equilibrium is the limit of ￿nite-horizon
equilibria. As is well known, an in￿nite-horizon game may also exhibit equilibria that
are not related in any direct way to ￿nite-horizon equilibria. This very common feature
of dynamic games is sometimes referred to as the failure of lower hemi-continuity of the
equilibrium correspondence at in￿nity. (See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).)
In most studies of both theory and application of dynamic games, attention is restricted to
27equilibria that are limits of their ￿nite-horizon counterparts. This is even true of the class
of linear-quadratic games, widely used in economics and in particular in strategic models
of macroeconomics. In the linear-quadratic framework, there is a unique equilibrium
in the in￿nite-horizon case with strategies that are linear functions of the state. This
equilibrium is easy to compute and characterize, and is always the limit of the unique
(Markov) equilibrium of the ￿nite-horizon version of the same game. While virtually
all studies of linear-quadratic games limit consideration to the linear equilibrium, the
in￿nite-horizon game often has other equilibria that are typically not related to the ￿nite-
horizon equilibrium. (See Basar and Olsder (1999) for further details on this point for
linear-quadratic games.7) The following example￿due to an anonymous contributor￿is
a reminder that restricting attention to limit equilibria is not without loss of generality in
our framework either. In particular, the Mankiw-Whinston tendency for excessive entry
need not hold.
Suppose the same Cournot game is repeated in all periods, where inverse demand is
P =1− Q and production costs are zero. Thus per-￿rm operating pro￿ti nap e r i o d





. Suppose ξ =2 , χ =1 .7,a n dδ = .99.I t i s
straightforward to establish that a social planner would maximize discounted producer
and consumer surplus (subject to Cournot behavior) by having three ￿rms enter in the
￿rst period and allowing no further entry or exit. There exist equilibria, however, that
exhibit no entry at all along the equilibrium path. One of the simplest is de￿ned as
follows. Given at−1,l e tι be the index of the active ￿rm at time t − 1 with the largest
index; formally, ι =m a x i∈{i|ai
t−1=1} i.( I f t h e r e a r e i n ￿nitely many active ￿rms then
ι = ∞.} Let #at−1 be the number of active ￿rms in period t − 1 and set #a0 =0 .F o r
each i,d e ￿ne ￿rm i￿s strategy as follows: for each t, ai
t−1 =1if #at−1 =6and ai
t−1 =1 ,o r
if #at−1 / ∈ {0,6,∞} and i ∈ {ι+1,...,ι+6},o ri f#at−1 = ∞ and i ∈ {1,...,6}; ai
t−1 =0
otherwise. Intuitively, since π(6)/(1 − δ) > ξ > χ > π(7)/(1 − δ), there are subgame
perfect Nash equilibria exhibiting entry by six ￿rms and no further entry or exit. These
7Another well-known example is the resource extraction model analysed by Levhari and Mirman
(1980). They also restrict consideration to the unique in￿nite-horizon equilibrium (also linear in the
stock) that they obtain as a limit of the ￿nite-horizon equilibrium while other in￿nite-horizon equilbria
may exist even in their simple model.
28equilibria can be used as ￿threats￿ to dissuade all entry. Speci￿cally, given the strategies
of the other ￿rms, if a ￿rm ever enters it will enjoy monopoly pro￿t for one period but will
be joined thereafter by six new ￿rms; it will thus ￿nd it optimal to exit without having
recouped its entry cost.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a general, stochastic, in￿nite-horizon model of entry and exit
with imperfect competition. It should be applicable to many traditional industrial organi-
zation questions, incorporating as it does an explicitly dynamic framework and requiring
an integer number of ￿rms. Some examples of applications were presented in the paper,
where it was shown that high sunk costs can actually reduce average industry concentra-
tion over time, that the lumpiness of the technology that results in imperfect competition
can explain entry when current pro￿ts are negative, and that the amount of entry may
not be positively correlated with the length of the product cycle. Going beyond examples,
a more general treatment of the welfare properties of equilibrium entry and exit was de-
veloped. In particular, a tendency toward excessive entry and insuﬃcient exit when there
is imperfect competition (a la Mankiw and Whinston (1986)) was shown to hold for all
equilibria obtained as limits of ￿nite-horizon equilibria using a last-in-￿rst-out exit rule.
On the other hand, a counterexample showed that this tendency need not be exhibited
by equilibria that are not limits of ￿nite-horizon equilibria.
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